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With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze combinatorial auctions where
agents’ valuations exhibit complementarities. Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most
k and also assuming that we can assess prices, we present a mechanism that is efficient, approximately
envy-free, asymptotically strategy-proof and that has polynomial-time complexity. Modifying an iterative
rounding procedure from assignment problems, we use the primal and dual optimal solutions to the linear
programming relaxation of the auction problem to construct a lottery for the allocations and to assess the
prices to bundles. The allocations in the lottery over-allocate goods by at most k−1 units, and the dual prices
are shown to be (approximately) envy-free irrespective of the allocation chosen. We conclude with a detailed
numerical investigation of a specific spectrum allocation problem.
CCS Concepts: •Theory of computation→ Algorithmic mechanism design; Computational pricing
and auctions; Rounding techniques;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Combinatorial auctions, Complementaries, Supporting prices, Wal-
rasian prices, Envy-free pricing mechanism
1. INTRODUCTION
Market design is widely applied to many real-world problems that have interesting
underlying resource allocation questions [Nisan et al. 2007; Krishna 2009; Easley and
Kleinberg 2010]. Most of the problems involve allocation of indivisible goods where
the preference exhibit complementarities with preferences over bundles of goods, and
also externalities. Some of these problems, such as matching of residents to hospi-
tals, matching of students to schools, or kidney exchanges, either explicitly bar the use
of monetary transfers or prices to facilitate market-making, or cannot use prices ow-
ing to non-numeraire preferences. In many others problems, such as online sponsored
search auctions, market clearing in electricity markets, or spectrum auctions, bids and
prices obtained via combinatorial auctions [Cramton et al. 2006; Blumrosen and Nisan
2007; Krishna 2009] are the mainstay of the underlying market-making. Despite the
wide-applicability of combinatorial auctions in the latter class of problems, it is well-
understood that without any restrictions on the agent utilities, the problems are com-
putationally intractable. In this paper, we focus on the generic combinatorial auction
problem, and under specific restrictions on the agent utilities present a randomized
mechanism with polynomial-time complexity that ensures ex-post approximate envy-
freeness and asymptotic strategy-proofness.
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Our main motivation for this work is spectrum auctions and markets [Berry et al.
2010; Milgrom 1998; Bulow et al. 2009; Cramton 1997, 2002]. Owing to interference
considerations, it is easily seen that agents (service providers) obtain higher total util-
ities for allocations when bands are adjacent either in frequency or space as opposed to
when the bands are separately allocated. Given the increased demand and utilization
of the airwaves, many governments have successfully conducted auctions to license
spectrum bands for use by commercial service providers, and sometimes via open-
access. As many more auctions are expected in the future, understanding classes of
utilities for which there exist optimal or almost optimal mechanisms with polynomial-
time complexity is an important area of research.
One of the principal reasons for the intractability of the combinatorial auction prob-
lem is that it includes the knapsack problem with the additional complexity of having
an exponential (in the number of goods being auctioned) number of integer variables.
In addition, even the linear programming relaxation is a hard problem as the number
of variables is still exponential in the number of goods. There is considerable research
on polynomial-time approximation algorithms in this context [Nisan 2000; Zurel and
Nisan 2001; Bartal et al. 2003; Blumrosen and Nisan 2007; Mu’Alem and Nisan 2008;
Dobzinski et al. 2012; Dobzinski and Nisan 2015; Nisan and Ronen 2007]. Starting
with the assumption of a single-minded1 buyer, the authors in [Blumrosen and Nisan
2007] present a greedy, constant-factor, polynomial-time, and strategy-proof approx-
imation mechanism for this problem that solicits bids and determines prices for the
agents who get allocated bundles. This approximation mechanism is then generalized
to larger class of utilities that can be obtained from the single-minded buyer setting us-
ing elementary operations. While this scheme provides a mechanism with many good
properties, it is not guaranteed to be efficient. With the same family of utilities, if the
linear-programming relaxation yields an integer solution [Blumrosen and Nisan 2007],
then the Second Welfare Theorem insists that the dual variables can be used to deter-
mine Walrasian market clearing prices [Babaioff et al. 2014; Blumrosen and Nisan
2007; Vohra and Krishnamurthi 2012] to be the assessed to agents that get allocated
bundles; the linear programming relaxation can be solved in polynomial-time with
the family of utilities considered. Complementary slackness also obtains envy-freeness
[Blumrosen and Nisan 2007; Vohra and Krishnamurthi 2012], wherein no agent gets
a higher return for the allocation of any other agent, and hence doesn’t envy it. Fur-
thermore, it is easily shown that in the presence of many agents, no agent gains much
by being untruthful about their valuations, i.e., asymptotic strategy-proofness also ob-
tains. These results will be important precedents that will be one part of the related
work.
Some recent developments for matching and assignment problems with complemen-
tarities, where either the valuations are non-numeraire or where prices cannot be
assessed, are also important precedents for our work. In [Nguyen et al. 2015] and
[Nguyen and Vohra 2014] the authors consider one-sided and two-sided matchings
with complementarities. An important restrictions on the utilities that they impose is
to assert that agents do not value bundles of size (number of good in the bundle include
multiplicities) greater than k (a parameter); just as in the single-minded buyer setting,
the valuation of the larger bundles can equivalently be set to the maximum of the bun-
dles contained within. The mechanisms developed then solve the linear programming
relaxation with envy-freeness explicitly accounted for as a constraint (because prices
cannot assessed in such problems). The key innovation is to then present a polynomial-
time integer-rounding-based lottery procedure such that the linear programming opti-
1Different agents are identified via specific bundles, say Si for agent i, and they have a positive constant
utility only for all bundles that contain Si.
mal solution is in the convex-hull of the integer solutions with the added property that
none of the integer solutions exceed the supply constraints by more than k − 1 units.
Note that efficiency is guaranteed as the expected utility is exactly that obtained from
the solution of the linear programming relaxation.
In this paper we adopt the k-sized bundles restrictions on the utilities from [Nguyen
et al. 2015] and [Nguyen and Vohra 2014], and ask whether there exists a polynomial-
time efficient randomized mechanism when the valuations are numeraire, and agents
have quasilinear utilities. The key difference in our problem is the ability to charge
prices, and so we further look for a mechanism that a’la Walrasian prices naturally
obtain envy-freeness, instead of imposing it as a constraint in the linear programming
relaxation. As mentioned earlier, spectrum auctions are one of the main motivations
for us to study such mechanisms, and there are policy guidelines that are being dis-
cussed for the upcoming incentive auctions by the FCC where certain players like
AT&T and Verizon will have restrictions on the bands that they can bid on [Cramton
et al. 2007; Shapiro et al. 2014]. Our k-bundle constraint on the utilities is a natural
form of such restrictions.
Our mechanism for allocation, called the POPT (Priced OPT) mechanism, starts with
the linear programming relaxation of the allocation problem with just the demand and
supply constraints; we call this problem by LIP. We solve LIP via the simplex method
to obtain an extreme point optimal and the corresponding Lagrange multipliers (dual
optimal). We then modify the integer-rounding procedure in [Nguyen et al. 2015] such
that each of the integer solutions is the optimal solution of a related linear program-
ming problem such that the dual optima include the dual optima for LIP. This is an
important modification that allows us to construct the prices for our mechanism. We
believe that this idea can be used in contexts. We then follow the lottery construc-
tion procedure from [Nguyen et al. 2015] with a few small modifications. We prove
the (approximate) envy-freeness of our mechanism first by showing a market-clearing
property of our prices that we call as supporting the allocation, and then by using
complementary slackness we demonstrate envy-freeness.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the POPT mechanism
and prove many properties of it, including approximate envy-freeness. We analyze the
performance of the mechanism in Section 3. We then briefly describe the open-source
implementation of the mechanism in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2. MECHANISM SETUP
We start by describing the mechanism. Thereafter, we elaborate on each of the steps of
the mechanism and prove properties of it.
For the POPT mechanism, we will use the following procedure to get an approximate
efficient allocation of the goods.
POPT mechanism:
(1) Set up initial linear programming problem (LIP).
(2) Solve (LIP) and get solution x∗.
(3) Perform Lottery Construction process on x∗ to get integral solutions
(4) Construct a lottery of the integral solutions that (approximately) has the expected
solution being x∗.
(5) Solve the dual of (LIP) to get POPT prices that support the allocation.
2.1. Initial Linear Programming Problem
We assume that we have a set N of agents and set G of good types. For every type
j of good, we have the supply for the good to be sj , where all goods of a given type
are identical. A bundle is denoted by a vector B ∈ Z|G|+ where the j-th coordinate Bj
denotes the number of good of type j in bundle B. If B1j ≤ B2j for all j ∈ G and B1 6= B2,
we say that B1 ≺ B2. Denote the set of all available bundles as B. Define the function
xi : B 7→ {0, 1}, i ∈ N as the indicator variable for the allocation of bundle B to agent
i. Therefore, xi(B) = 1 means that bundle B is allocated to agent i. Function ui : B 7→
R, i ∈ N determines the valuations of each agent for all possible bundles, i.e. ui(B) = p
means that bundle B has value p for agent i.
To make this problem solvable in polynomial time, we assume that the agents are
only interested in bundles with size less than or equal to k. In other words, the valua-
tion can only be positive for bundles B such that∑
j∈G
Bj ≤ k ∀B ∈ B.
Therefore, for bundles B with size larger than k we fix xi(B) = 0; alternatively we can
follow the convention for single-mind buyers and set the valuations of a bundle with
size greater than k to be the maximum of the valuation of its subsets. In either case,
then we can reduce the set B to contain only the k-bundles, which denotes the bundles
with size less than or equal to k. Furthermore, we relax xi(B) to take values in [0, 1].
This way the problem of solving xi(B) can be formulated as a linear programming
problem on a convex set.
The demand constraints for the allocation insist that every agent gets at most one
bundle. These are given by ∑
B∈B
xi(B) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N. (Demand)
The supply constraints ensure that the goods are not over-allocated. They are given
by ∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjxi(B) ≤ sj ∀j ∈ G. (Supply)
The objective function to be maximized is the total utility of the agents. Therefore
the initial linear programming problem can be formulated as
max
x≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
ui(B)xi(B)
s.t.
∑
B∈B
xi(B) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N,∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjxi(B) ≤ sj ∀j ∈ G.
We make some modifications to the coefficients of the problem, and we get
max
x≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
wi(B)ui(B)xi(B)
s.t.
∑
B∈B
xi(B) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N,∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjxi(B) ≤ s˜j := sj − j ∀j ∈ G.
(LIP)
where wi(B) are weights which typically takes values near 1 and j  1 are modifi-
cation variables. For our mechanism, we choose wi and j randomly, where wi(B) are
drawn i.i.d. uniformly on [1 − δw, 1 + δw], and j are drawn i.i.d. uniformly on [δ, 2δ].
Here δw  1 and δ  1 are preset values. The reason for this is to ensure asymptotic
strategy-proofness, and this will be discussed in the Section 3.
To solve the problem, we first solve (LIP) and get a solution x∗, which is most likely
to be fractional. If it is fractional, we run the lottery construction process using the
solution x∗ to get a few integral solutions to form a lottery to determine the resulting
allocation.
2.2. Obtaining Integral Solutions
For the lottery construction we need a subroutine called Iterative Rounding (IR). Given
any reward vector c, the Iterative Rounding procedure basically takes any point z
which satisfies (Demand) and (Supply) as input, and outputs an integral x. This pro-
cedure can be denoted as a function x = IR(z) or x = IR(z; c).
2.2.1. Iterative Rounding. For the Iterative Rounding procedure, we basically follow the
procedure described in [Nguyen et al. 2015] but we also make some modifications. For
any reward vector c ∈ R|N |×|B| which has the same size as the input z, the procedure
is as described in Algorithm 1.
The main difference between our proposed iterative rounding procedure and that in
[Nguyen et al. 2015] lies in the second step where we set N (τ). In our procedure, we
preserve the equality constraints so that we can ensure that the set of active demand
constraints for input z is a subset of that of output z(τ). Therefore we can ensure that
the Lagrange multipliers of the original problem (LIP) also apply to zτ . This will be
discussed further in Theorem 2.2 in Section 2.3. It then promotes the existence of
supporting prices for the allocation scheme z(τ), which would be discussed in Theorem
2.4.
It is easy to see that the procedure would finish in polynomial time, since in each
iteration, either at least one variable is eliminated or at least one constraint is elimi-
nated. So the number of rounds cannot be larger than sum of the number of constraints
and the number of variables.
Define the approximate supply constraint∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjxi(B) ≤ sj + k − 1 ∀j ∈ G. (Supply+k-1)
We have the following results.
THEOREM 2.1. For any reward vector c and any vector z that satisfies (Supply), we
have z = IR(z; c) to satisfy (Supply+k-1) and cT z ≥ cT z.
PROOF. See Appendix B in [Nguyen et al. 2015].
From Theorem 2.1, we know that for any z that satisfies (Demand) and (Supply) and
any vector c, we can always find out an integral z (using Iterative Rounding Algorithm)
which satisfies (Demand) and (Supply+k-1) such that cT z ≥ cT z.
2.3. Lottery Construction
For the Lottery Construction part, we also basically follow the algorithm described by
[Nguyen et al. 2015], but here again we make some modifications.
The procedure is as described in Algorithm 2.
The main difference between our proposed procedure and that of [Nguyen et al.
2015] lies in the initialization steps. In the two steps we initialize a non-empty set F (0)
so that the quadratic programming problem in the first step in the loop would always
have a solution.
ALGORITHM 1: Iterative Rounding
Input: A point z which satisfies (Demand) and (Supply)
Output: An integral point z(τ) which satisfies (Demand) and (Supply+k-1)
G(0) = G, B(0)i = B ∀i ∈ N, s˜(0)j = s˜j ∀j ∈ G, z(τ) = z, τ = 0;
N (τ) = {i ∈ N :∑i∈N zi(B) = 1};
repeat
if z(τ) is integral then
break
end
if some but not all of z(τ)i (B) are integral then
B(τ+1)i = {B ∈ B : 0 < z(τ)i (B) < 1};
s˜
(τ+1)
j = s
′(τ)
j −
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B(τ)i \B
(τ+1)
i
Bjz
(τ)
i (B) ∀j ∈ G(τ).;
The updated linear programming problem is then
max
x≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B(τ+1)i
ci(B)xi(B)
s.t. xi(B) = z
(τ)
i (B) ∀i ∈ N,B ∈ B\B(τ+1)i∑
B∈B(τ+1)i
xi(B) = 1 ∀i ∈ N (τ),
∑
B∈B(τ+1)i
xi(B) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N\N (τ),
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B(τ+1)i
Bjxi(B) ≤ s˜(τ+1)j ∀j ∈ G(τ).
(ULIP)
Solve (ULIP) to get an extreme point solution z∗, set z(τ+1) = z∗;
end
if none of z(τ+1)i (B) is integral then
G(τ+1) = {j ∈ G(τ) :∑i∈N∑B∈B(τ+1)i Bj > ds˜(τ+1)j e+ k − 1};
Comment: By [Nguyen et al. 2015] there must exist some j ∈ G(τ) such that∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B(τ+1)i
Bj ≤ ds˜(τ+1)j e+ k − 1.
end
τ = τ + 1.
until Forever;
The authors of [Nguyen et al. 2015] proved that the above algorithm terminates in
polynomial time. After the algorithm terminates, we get a the set of (integral) points F ,
where the fractional solution x∗ of (LIP) is contained in the convex hull of all points in
F = {x1, x2, · · · , xl}. The coefficients λi where x∗ =
∑l
i=1 λix
i,
∑l
i=1 λi = 1 is also cal-
culated from the quadratic programming problem in the loop. Then we can randomly
select one vector xi from set F (with probability λi) as the final allocation.
THEOREM 2.2. Suppose x∗ is a solution for (LIP). Any x ∈ F is an optimal solution
to the following problem.
ALGORITHM 2: Lottery Construction
Input: Fractional Optimal Solution x∗
Output: Set F of integral points that satisfy (Demand) and (Supply+k-1).
c
(1)
i (B) = wi(B)ui(B), ∀B ∈ B;
x′ = IR(x∗; c(1));
c
(2)
i (B) = −wi(B)ui(B), ∀B ∈ B;
x′ = IR(x∗; c(2));
F (0) = {x′, x′′}, τ = 0;
ε is a preset allowable error;
δz =
δ√
|N |∑B∈B B2j for some j ∈ G;
Comment: Note that the value of δz is independent of j, since B is the set of all k-bundles and it
is symmetric with regard to any j ∈ G.
repeat
y∗ = argminy{‖y − x∗‖ : y lies in the convex hull E of all points in F (τ)};
(Quadratic Programming)
if ‖y∗ − x∗‖ < ε then
break
else
(y∗ may lie on a surface of the convex hull E. There exist a minimal subset F ′ ⊆ F (τ)
such that y ∈ intE′ where E′ is the convex hull of F ′.)
F (τ+1) = F ′;
z = x∗ + δz x
∗−y∗
‖x∗−y∗‖ .
z = IR(z, x∗ − y∗);
F (τ+1) = F (τ+1) ∪ {z};
end
τ = τ + 1
until Forever;
max
x≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
wi(B)ui(B)xi(B)
s.t.
∑
B∈B
xi(B) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N,∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjxi(B) ≤ sj ∀j ∈ G,
(MLIP)
where
sj :=

s˜j
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjx
∗
i (B) < s˜j and
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjxi(B) ≤ s˜j∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjxi(B) otherwise
for all j ∈ G, and we have sj ≤ sj + k − 1 for all j ∈ G. Furthermore, any dual solution
of (LIP) is also a dual solution of (MLIP).
PROOF. See Appendix A.
From Theorem 2.2 we see that if we modify the supply vector from s˜j to sj , then
we have the allocation linear programming problem to have an integral optimal solu-
tion. The optimality of the solution for a specified problem ensures that the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the original problem (LIP) is also a Lagrange multiplier for
(MLIP). This is important in establishing the existence of supporting prices, which will
be discussed further in Theorem 2.4. Furthermore, the fact that sj ≤ sj+k−1 indicates
that for any final allocation scheme, we need no more than k − 1 additional goods for
each type of good to fulfill the allocation just as in [Nguyen et al. 2015].
2.4. POPT Prices
In this section, we will construct a set of prices from the dual solution of (MLIP) in
Theorem 2.2. Then we will discover some nice properties of the prices. We will prove
that the prices support the allocation scheme and are envy-free. We will call these
prices POPT prices.
2.4.1. Dual Solution as Supporting Prices. After getting the allocation from the above
procedure, we would like to find a set of prices for different kind of goods to support
the allocation. We would like the prices to have the property that every agent chooses
the bundle that yields the best (within some acceptable error) payoff, resulting in the
designed allocation.
Definition 2.3. Let u be the acceptable error2 in utility, and P (B) denote the price
of bundle B, then a set of prices is said to support allocation scheme x if for every
agent, either the agent chooses some bundle Bˆ according to x and
ui(Bˆ)− P (Bˆ) ≥ ui(B)− P (B)− u, ∀B ∈ B,
or he chooses to buy nothing and
ui(B)− P (B) ≤ u, ∀B ∈ B.
If u = 0, then the definition coincides with users with allocations in their preferred
set of bundles (after accounting for the price), and users with no allocations making
a non-positive return on every good. Market-clearing prices have this property along
with the market-clearing property.
THEOREM 2.4. The set of supporting prices associated with any designed allocation
x ∈ F (from lottery construction procedure of POPT mechanism) exists.
PROOF. See Appendix B.
Remark 2.5. From Theorem 2.4, we know that supporting prices always exists for
the allocation we get from Lottery Construction procedure, since the solution of dual of
(MLIP) are supporting prices. From the proof of the Theorem 2.2 (in Appendix A), we
can see that the Lagrange multipliers of original (LIP) are also multipliers of (MLIP),
which means that a dual solution of (LIP) is also a dual solution of (MLIP). Therefore
a dual solution of (LIP) forms a supporting price for any designed allocation scheme
x ∈ F . Ensuring that this property holds is an important contribution of our paper.
2.4.2. Dual Solution as Approximately Envy-free Prices. The following part shows that
under the prices given by the dual solution of (MLIP), the allocation suggested by x
is approximately envy-free. We first give a formal definition of envy-freeness, then we
show the allocation and prices we obtain ensure this property. It is important to note
that unlike in [Nguyen et al. 2015], envy-freeness is not added as an explicit constraint
in (LIP).
2For example, when people make trades of millions of dollars, they would not care the utility difference of
only one dollar. In this case u = 1 dollar. In general u can be set arbitrarily small.
Definition 2.6. Let P (B) denote the price of bundle B (the price of an empty bundle
is 0), x be the allocation vector, and u be the acceptable error. Then the pricing rule is
said to be approximately envy-free if3∑
B∈B
[ui(B)− P (B)]xi(B) ≥
∑
B∈B
[ui(B)− P (B)]xk(B) + u, ∀i, k ∈ N
THEOREM 2.7. Under any optimal allocation x∗ for problem (LIP), if the pricing
rule is
P (B) =
∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j
where p∗j (j ∈ G) is some Lagrange multiplier associated with supply constraints of
(LIP), then the approximate envy-freeness condition holds.
PROOF. See Appendix C.
PROPOSITION 2.8. For any integral allocation x ∈ B, if the price rule is
P (B) =
∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j
where p∗j (j ∈ G) is some Lagrange multiplier associated with supply constraints of
(LIP), then the approximate envy-freeness condition (not only holds for x∗ but) also
holds for x.
PROOF. From the Proof of Theorem 2.2 (Appendix A) we know that if (pi∗, v∗) is a
set of Lagrange multiplier of (LIP), then (pi∗, v∗) is also a set of Lagrange multiplier of
(MLIP). Since x is a solution to (MLIP) according to Theorem 2.2, we have p∗j to be also
the Largrange Multipliers for (MLIP). Apply Theorem 2.4 to (MLIP) then we would
find that the approximate envy-freeness condition holds for x.
From Proposition 2.8 we know that we can calculate the dual solution of (LIP) in-
stead of (MLIP) to figure out a set of POPT prices that supports all possible allocation
x. This is important, as we can then get the dual solution of (LIP) through the pro-
cess of solving (LIP). We do not need to construct and solve the dual of (MLIP), which
makes the calculation of prices much more efficient.
2.5. Summary of POPT Mechanism
For the POPT mechanism, we try to find an approximately efficient and envy-free
allocation scheme for spectrum band allocation with complementarities as well as the
price of goods associated with the scheme. To achieve this we first relax the constraint
to allow the allocation indicator variables to be real-valued, and we set up an initial
linear programming problem (LIP) with only the demand and supply constraints. We
then solve (LIP) to get a solution x∗.
Then, we perform the Lottery construction process on x∗ to round x∗ to a set F of
integral solutions. We then assign a probability to each of these integral solutions to
form a lottery such that it has expectation x∗.
When realizing the mechanism, we choose an integral solution in F based on some
random event (such as rolling a die) so that every integral solution has the probability
of being chosen equal to the probability assigned to it.
3The definition is an extension of the definition in [Guruswami et al. 2005] as they consider exact envy-
freeness, i.e. the case when u = 0.
We solve the dual problem of (LIP) at the same time to obtain the prices associ-
ated with POPT mechanism. As implied by Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.7, this price
supports any allocation scheme given by POPT mechanism and it is approximately
envy-free.
3. ANALYSIS
In this section we start by showing asymptotic strategy-proofness of the POPT mecha-
nism, and then present a numerical analysis of a specific spectrum allocation problem.
3.1. Theoretical Analysis
In this part, we will first analyze the complexity and strategy-proofness of the mech-
anism. Then we will discuss on the methods for solving the linear programming prob-
lems for the mechanism.
3.1.1. Complexity Analysis. Fix k, the calculation of the approximate optimal alloca-
tion can be performed in polynomial time with regard to |N | and |G|. (See Appendix
D) The mechanism is therefore much more computationally efficient than the optimal
mechanism: integer linear programming with VCG prices.
3.1.2. Asymptotic Strategy-proofness. One important property that a mechanism
should have is strategy-proofness. A mechanism is said to be strategy-proof if the best
strategy for any individual agent is to report his or her utility truthfully.
Consider that we have finite types of agents, and the set of type is denoted as Θ =
{θ1, θ2, · · · , θm}, and the number of agents with type θ is nθ. Denote the utility of bundle
B for agent of type θ as uθ(B) and the type of agent i as βi. Following [Nguyen et al.
2015] we define asymptotic strategy-proofness as follows.
Definition 3.1. If x, p are the allocation vector and price vector that POPT mecha-
nism gives when every agent report his or her type βi truthfully, and x˜ and p˜ are the
corresponding results when agent i report as type γ while others report their types
truthfully, a mechanism is called asymptotically strategy-proof if for any ε0 > 0 there
exists N0 ∈ N such that when nθ > N0 for all t = 1, 2, · · · ,m we have
E
[∑
B∈B
(uβi(B)− p(B))xi(B)
]
≥ E
[∑
B∈B
(uζ(B)− p˜(B))x˜i(B)
]
− u − ε0
for all i ∈ N, ζ ∈ Θ, where u > 0 is the acceptable error.
This definition generally means that when the number of agents comes large, the
increase of average payoff that an agent could get by misreporting his or her type
becomes less and less and converges to a number less than or equal to u. If the agents
are risk-neutral, then this implies that an agent would not have an impulse to mis-
report her type.
The following theorem is a variant of Theorem 3.3 in [Nguyen et al. 2015]. The
additional steps arise from ensuring the convergence of the dual variables.
THEOREM 3.2. Setwi to be the same for the same type of agents, then the mechanism
POPT is asymptotically strategy-proof.
PROOF. See Appendix E.
Therefore, we can say that the POPT mechanism is approximately truthful. When
the number of agents get large, one can get approximately the best payoff by reporting
his or her true type.
3.1.3. Methods for Solving Linear Programming Problem. For the initial linear program-
ming problem (LIP) and updated linear programming problems (ULIP) in Iterative
Rounding, we choose the Simplex method to solve them. The reasons for us to choose
Simplex method are given as follows.
(1) It is fast in practice. The average complexity of simplex method is O(s) where s is
the number of constraints. In (LIP), we have significantly fewer constraints than
variables, thus it is very suitable for (LIP).
(2) It solves the problem based on extreme points. In (LIP) and all (ULIP), we would
like to find an extreme point solution. Simplex method ensures that the solution is
an extreme point.
3.2. Empirical Analysis
In the following part, we will analyze the whole mechanism from multiple perspectives.
Based on a utility model that is described in [Zhou et al. 2013], we will first investigate
the efficiency of the mechanism on a utility model. Then we will investigate how many
more goods we need on average to fulfill the allocation suggested by the mechanism.
We will use a grid structure for the analysis, so next we will discuss how the prices
and the allocations change based on location. Finally, we finely categorize the form of
integer solutions produced by our mechanism, especially the shapes of the bundles.
The utility model is constructed in the following way: Consider a 2-D area that is a
mg × ng grid, each grid has unit area and it is considered as a type of good. For each
grid (good) there are sg bands, which can be viewed as the available supply for the grid.
There are Na agents and each agent would like at most a bundle of ka goods.
For each agent, there are some end-users distributed via a 2-D spatial Poisson pro-
cess in the area, with parameter µ (person/unit area). The parameter µ determines the
system load, which we will vary. The utility of grid j to an agent i, which is denoted as
uij , is proportional to the number of end users associated with that agent in that area.
However, this utility can only be fully realized when the agent gets the same amount
of bands in all adjacent areas. If the agent fails to get the same amount of bands in
some adjacent area, a boundary cost applies.
The boundary cost if agent i gets some bands in area j but fails to get the same
amount of bands in area k is denoted as cijk. We have c
i
jk to be proportional to the
number of end users of agent i in the boundary area of grid j which is close to grid k.
For each grid, we specify λ as the proportion of boundary area. Denote G as the set
of grids (goods), and E as the set of adjacent grid pairs. Then the utility functions on
bundles are given by
ui(B) =
∑
j∈G
uij −
∑
(j,k)∈E
(Bj −Bk)+cijk
We do not specialize our analysis and mechanism to the given form of the utility func-
tions. In future work, we plan on studying mechanisms tailored to the specific forms
of utility functions described above in order to see if further improvements in perfor-
mance (in terms of complexity and memory) can be had.
3.2.1. Analysis of Efficiency. Set mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka = 4. The total
utility versus the portion λ of boundary is shown in Figure 1. From the figure we can
see when the boundary area gets larger, the boundary cost rises and the total utility
gets smaller.
The total utility under three different allocations are compared: average utility for
the integral LP optimal solution when the supplies are sj +k−1; average utility under
POPT mechanism (when supplies are sj); and average utility for the (fractional) LP
optimal solution (when supplies are sj). The experimental results match the theory so
that the POPT mechanism has nearly the same average utility as LP optimal solutions.
The average for IntLP is only a little bit larger than that of the POPT mechanism
for all values of µ and λ, which indicates that POPT mechanism is near optimal in
expectation. Note that we have to consider the average utility in order to average the
spatial Poisson process realizations.
Fig. 1. Resulting utility under different allocation rules vs. λ for mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka = 4.
3.2.2. Analysis of Overallocation of Supply. From analysis of the POPT mechanism it is
clear that we may need to add some additional goods for some regions. We have seen
that the theoretical bound for the number of additional goods added per supply is k−1.
However,in the case mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka = 4 (where the total demand
exceeds the total supply), experimental results (Figure 2) show that in most cases, the
total number of additional goods is significantly less than (k − 1)|G|. While we have
(ka − 1)|G| = 27, we have the total number of additional goods less than or equal to 12
in more than 99% of the cases.
From Figure 3, we can see that the average additional goods gets smaller as the in-
terference cost coefficient λ gets larger. When the interference cost is low (λ = 0.1), we
have the average additional goods to be 2.99, which then decreases to roughly 1.5 when
the interference cost is high (λ = 0.8). Both of these are a small compared to the total
number of goods, mgngsg = 90. Even the maximum number of goods added, empiricaly
10, is a small fraction of the total number of good. We then conclude that the mech-
anism is approximately efficient, and it does not require the addition of significantly
more goods for each type.
3.2.3. Analysis of Local Statistics. Besides the global performance of the mechanism,
such as the total utility, total additional goods, we also look into the statistics of the
results for each element of the grid. For the case mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka =
4, µ = 20, we investigate the distribution of number of actual allocated goods for each
element of the grid. Here the numbers are such that the total demand exceeds the total
supply.
Since the allocation distributions for each element of the grid are visually similar
looking, we compute the total variational distances between the distribution of differ-
ent grid locations. These distances are used as a metric for us to determine whether
Fig. 2. Number of over-allocated goods when mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka = 4, µ = 20.
Fig. 3. Average Additional Goods vs. λ for mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka = 4, µ = 20
two distributions are similar or not. For the 3x3 grid, grid locations (1, 1), (1, 3), (3, 1)
and (3, 3) are statistically similar, as they are both on the corners of the area and share
the same number of borders with the neighboring locations. By the same logic, grid lo-
cations (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 3) and (3, 2) are also statistically similar. For statistically similar
grids, we expect that the distributions of the allocations in these grid locations would
be close to each other; note that this argument is only for the marginal distributions.
In Figure 4 we find that the distance between allocation distributions on statistically
dissimilar grid locations does not differ a lot from that of statistically similar ones.
We believe this because the demand exceeds the supply so that all locations get fully
subscribed.
However, as we notice from Figure 5 when the total demand exceeds the total supply,
the prices at different grid locations show significant variations. The average prices
of interior grid locations are generally higher than that of the grid locations on the
boundary of the arena. We also observe that the larger the interference parameter λ,
the larger the difference in the average prices. This matches our intuition that the
interior grids are generally more valuable since there are fewer boundaries with other
locations, especially when the interference cost is large.
Fig. 4. Total variation distance of allocation distributions vs. λ for mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka =
4, µ = 20
Fig. 5. Average price of different grids vs. λ for mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka = 4, µ = 20
For the case mg = ng = 4, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka = 4, µ = 20, we also investigated the
distribution of number of allocation on each grid. Here the total supply exceeds the to-
tal demand. Unlike the case when total demand exceeds the total supply, here we can
see that the number of allocations differs significantly based on the grid locations (Fig-
ure 6). In general, the average number of allocations for interior grids are greater than
that of the grids on the boundaries of the area. Here we do not display any statistics
for the prices as they’re all uniformly low, as is to be expected.
3.2.4. Analysis of Shape of Bundles. We also investigate on the geometry of the bun-
dles that the mechanism allocate to the users. Typically, bundles with more internal
boundaries are more valuable than those with fewer internal boundaries. We expect
that the mechanism would prefer to allocate bundles with more internal boundaries
(such as ”O”-shaped 4-bundles), especially when the interference cost is high.
The empirical results agree with our intuition. As we observe from Figure 7, for the
case where mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka = 4, µ = 20, λ = 0.8, more 4-bundles
are allocated than 3-bundles. Note that this is a setting where the demand exceeds
the supply. Among all the 4-bundles that are allocated, bundles with more internal
boundaries are significantly preferred by the mechanism, which means that the num-
ber of ”O”-shaped bundles of the resulting allocation is significantly higher than that
of bundles of any other shape (”L”-shaped, ”T”-shaped, or ”Z”-shaped bundles).
We also investigate the case when mg = ng = 4, sg = 10, Na = 45, ka = 4, µ =
20, λ = 0.8. In this case, nearly all assigned bundles are 4-bundles. Note that here
Fig. 6. CDF of Number of allocations for specific grid locations for mg = ng = 4, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka = 4
Fig. 7. Statistics on size of bundles, and number of boundaries within bundles given the size of a bundle,
mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 30, ka = 4, λ = 0.8
the total supply exceeds the total demand. From Figure 8 we can see that most of the
assigned 4-bundles has 4 internal boundaries, which means that they are ”O”-shaped.
This again matches our intuition.
Fig. 8. Statistics on size of bundles, and number of boundaries within bundles given the size of a bundle,
mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 45, ka = 4, λ = 0.8
3.2.5. Analysis of Supporting Prices. We have theoretical guarantees that every agent
obtains a bundle with his or her best possible payoff within some error u. The er-
ror u can be controlled by parameter δw. To verify this empirically we calculate the
difference between the actual payoff an agent obtains and the best possible payoff.
Theoretically, this difference should be larger than −u, which is a very small number.
Setting δw = 10−5, in the case of mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 45, ka = 4, µ = 20, λ = 0.8,
we observe in Figure 9 that in most cases the difference is 0; results of all iterations
and all agents are pooled together in the figure. We also find that the minimum payoff
difference we obtain in simulation is −0.0011, which indicates a loss. However as we
found the average actual payoff that agents obtain to be 4.123, we conclude that the
loss is negligible. Actually, this loss can be arbitrarily small as we set δw to be small.
Fig. 9. Payoff difference of agents for mg = ng = 3, sg = 10, Na = 45, ka = 4, µ = 20, λ = 0.8
4. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the POPT mechanism as the Spectrum Allocation Tool in Python. It
takes advantage of package CVXPY [Diamond et al. 2014] and uses ECOS solver [Dom-
ahidi et al. 2013] to solve linear programming and quadratic programming problems,
where ECOS is one of the most efficient solvers among all free solvers. The tool can be
easily adapted to commercial solvers like GUROBI or MOSEK when these solvers are
available to the user. The tool accepts two kinds of input: JSON and plain text. GUI in-
put is currently not accepted as the input is usually some large data, which makes GUI
input inconvenient. After calculation, the tool will visualize the resulting allocation
scheme. The tool is open-source and is available at https://bitbucket.org/dwtang/batool
.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS
In this paper we proposed the POPT mechanism based on the OPT mechanism for
matching problems where prices cannot be assessed [Nguyen et al. 2015], where
we utilize prices to allocate goods to agents with complementarities in preferences.
We have proved that the mechanism is approximately envy-free and asymptotically
strategy-proof. We have also shown that the mechanism is approximately efficient in
practice. Finally we implemented the mechanism as a GUI tool to enable practice of
the mechanism in real world settings.
The POPT mechanism has a few nice properties. First, as the mechanism utilizes
prices, envy-freeness emerges as a consequence and does not need to be imposed as
a constraint in the underlying optimization problem. Furthermore, the prices for the
mechanism are independent of what allocation the lottery scheme picks from the avail-
able allocation scheme set. Since the prices are the dual variables of the initial linear
programming relaxation, we can calculate the prices at the same time of solving it,
which makes the calculation of prices efficient.
In the future work, we plan on generalizing our mechanism to the case that each
agent may desire more than one bundle. We also plan on determining theoretic guar-
antees on the efficiency of the mechanism using the optimal integer allocation with
k − 1 extra goods of each type.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 2.2
Let x∗ be one optimal solution for (LIP). Define set S as
S =
{
z ∈ R|N |×|B|
∣∣∣ x∗i (B) = 0⇒ zi(B) = 0,∑
i∈N
x∗i (B) = 1⇒
∑
i∈N
zi(B) = 1, z satisfies (Supply + k − 1)
}
LEMMA A.1. For any z ∈ S that satisfies (Supply), we have x = IR(z) ∈ S.
PROOF. If z ∈ S and x = IR(z), it follows from definition of S as well as the proce-
dure of Iterative Rounding (described in Section 2.2.1) that
x∗i (B)⇒ zi(B) = 0⇒ xi(B) = 0∑
i∈N
x∗i (B) = 1⇒
∑
i∈N
zi(B) = 1⇒
∑
i∈N
xi(B) = 1
If z satisfies (Supply), from Theorem 2.1 it follows that x satisfies (Supply+k-1) (thus
we have sj ≤ sj + k − 1). Therefore, for any z ∈ S that satisfies (Supply), we have
x = IR(z) ∈ S.
Then we will use induction to prove that F ⊆ S after Lottery Construction procedure.
— From Lemma A.1 we deduct that since x∗ ∈ S and x∗ satisfies (Supply), we have
x′, x′′ ∈ S. Hence, the initial F (0) ⊆ S.
— Suppose that in the p-th iteration of Lottery Construction we have F (p) ⊆ S. In this
iteration, we have y∗ =
∑l
t=1 λtx
t,
∑l
t=1 λt = 1 where x
t ∈ S for t = 1, 2, · · · , l. As
x∗i (B) = 0⇒ x1i (B) = 0, x2i (B) = 0, · · · , xli(B) = 0
⇒ y∗i (B) =
l∑
j=1
λjx
j
i (B) = 0∑
i∈N
x∗i (B) = 1⇒
∑
i∈N
x1i (B) = 1,
∑
i∈N
x2i (B) = 1, · · · ,
∑
i∈N
xli(B) = 1
⇒
∑
i∈N
y∗i (B) =
l∑
t=1
λt
∑
i∈N
xji (B) =
l∑
t=1
λt = 1
and
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjy
∗
i (B) =
l∑
t=1
λt
(∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjx
j
i (B)
)
≤
l∑
t=1
λt(sj + k − 1) = (sj + k − 1)
l∑
t=1
λt
= sj + k − 1
which means that y∗ satisfies (Supply+k-1). We then have y∗ ∈ S.
Then, as z = x∗ + δz x
∗−y∗
‖x∗−y∗‖ , we have∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjzi(B) =
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjx
∗
i (B) + δz
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bj
x∗i (B)− y∗i (B)
‖x∗ − y∗‖
≤ s˜j +
δ
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B Bj(x
∗
i (B)− y∗i (B))√∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B B
2
j · ‖x∗ − y∗‖
= sj − j + δ b
T
(x∗ − y∗)
‖b‖ · ‖x∗ − y∗‖ (b
T
is the j-th row vector of B)
≤ sj − δ + δ (Using Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality)
= sj
Thus z satisfies (Supply). And as y∗ ∈ S we have
x∗i (B) = 0⇒ x∗i (B), y∗i (B) = 0
⇒ zi(B) = x∗i (B) + δz
x∗i (B)− y∗i (B)
‖x∗ − y∗‖ = 0∑
i∈N
x∗i (B) = 1⇒
∑
i∈N
x∗i (B) = 1,
∑
i∈N
y∗i (B) = 1
⇒
∑
i∈N
zi(B) =
∑
i∈N
x∗i (B) + δz
∑
i∈N x
∗
i (B)−
∑
i∈N y
∗
i (B)
‖x∗ − y∗‖
= 1 + δz · 1− 1‖x∗ − y∗‖ = 1
Thus we have z ∈ S. Therefore by Lemma A.1 z = IR(z; c) ∈ S. Therefore, the
updated (p+ 1-th iteration’s) F (p+1) = F (p) ∪ {z} still satisfies F (p+1) ⊆ S.
Therefore we conclude that F ⊆ S in all iterations. Thus the final set F ⊆ S. This
means that, any allocation vector x ∈ F satisfies
x∗i (B) = 0⇒ xi(B) = 0,∑
i∈N
x∗i (B) = 1⇒
∑
i∈N
xi(B) = 1
From the definition of sj we can see that∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjzi(B) = s˜j ⇒
∑
i∈N
∑
B∈B
Bjxi(B) = sj
Denote the coefficient matrix of x in constraints of (LIP) and (MLIP) as A and the
upperbound vector as b for (LIP) and b for (MLIP). Then (LIP) can be denoted as
max
x≥0
{uTx : Ax ≤ b} and (MLIP) can be denoted as max
x≥0
{uTx : Ax ≤ b}. Then the
above can be rewritten as
(Ax∗ − b)k = 0⇒ (Ax− b)k = 0
Since linear programming problems are convex problems, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality. Since x∗ is optimal for (LIP) we have
the KKT condition: exist pi∗, v∗ ≥ 0 such that
−u+ATpi∗ − v∗ = 0
pi∗T (Ax∗ − b) = 0
Ax∗ ≤ b
v∗Tx∗ = 0
By complementary slackness we have
v∗i (B) > 0⇒ zi(B) = 0⇒ xi(B) = 0
pi∗k > 0⇒ (Ax∗ − b)k = 0⇒ (Ax− b)k = 0
Therefore we have
v∗Tx = 0
pi∗T (Ax− b) = 0
And given the definition of sj we can find that x is feasible for (MLIP), that is
Ax ≤ b
Thus we have KKT conditions also holds for x in (MLIP) (and the same Lagrange
multipliers apply). Therefore x is an optimal solution to (MLIP).
As a result of the proof, we show that any dual variable of (LIP) is also a dual solution
to (MLIP).
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2.4
The dual problem of (MLIP) in Theorem 2.2 is given by
min
α,p≥0
∑
i∈N
αi +
∑
j∈G
sjpj
s.t. αi ≥ wi(B)ui(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjpj ∀i ∈ N,B ∈ B
(DMLIP)
where αi,∀i ∈ N are the Lagrange multipliers associated with demand constraints of
(MLIP), and pj ,∀j ∈ G are the Lagrange multipliers associated with supply constraints
of (MLIP).
As x is the optimal solution to the primal problem according to Theorem 2.2, we
know that the dual problem must also have at least one optimal solution.
Suppose that (α, p) is an optimal solution for the dual problem, first we must have
αi = max
B∈B
wi(B)ui(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjpj , 0
 .
(If αi is less than the right hand side, then it is not feasible for the dual problem. If αi
is larger than the right hand side, then the objective function value is larger)
By complementary slackness condition we have
xi(Bˆ) > 0 ⇒ αi = wi(Bˆ)ui(Bˆ)−
∑
j∈G
Bˆjpj∑
i∈N
xi(Bˆ) < 1 ⇒ αi = 0
Then we have
Agent i gets bundle Bˆ
⇒ αi = wi(Bˆ)ui(Bˆ)−
∑
j∈G
Bˆjpj = max
B∈B
wi(B)ui(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjpj

⇒ ui(Bˆ)−
∑
j∈G
Bˆjpj ≥ ui(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjpj
− [(wi(Bˆ)− 1)ui(Bˆ) + (1− wi(B))ui(B)] ∀B ∈ B
Agent i gets no bundle
⇒ αi = 0 = max
B∈B
wi(B)ui(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjpj , 0

⇒ wi(B)ui(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjpj ≤ 0 ∀B ∈ B
⇒ ui(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjpj ≤ (1− wi(B))ui(B) ∀B ∈ B
Define Mi = maxB∈B{ui(B)}. Since wi is uniformly distributed in [1− δw, 1 + δw] we
have the following
Agent i gets bundle Bˆ
⇒ ui(Bˆ)−
∑
j∈G
Bˆjpj ≥ ui(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjpj − 2δwMi ∀B ∈ B
Agent i gets no bundle
⇒ ui(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjpj ≤ δwMi ∀B ∈ B
By choosing δw to be small enough, we can make sure that 2δwMi ≤ u for all i ∈ N .
Then we know that given the bundled price rule
Price(B) =
∑
j∈G
Bjpj
the agents would choose bundles that yields the best (within acceptable error) payoff,
resulting in the designed allocation x. Thus, prices that support x exists.
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 2.7
Let α∗i (i ∈ N) denote some Lagrange multipliers associated with demand constraints
in (LIP) (such that (α∗, p∗) is an optimal solution for the dual of (LIP)), from compli-
mentary slackness we know that
α∗i = max
B∈B
wi(B)ui(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j , 0

x∗i (B) > 0⇒ αi = wi(B)ui(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j
⇒ wi(B)ui(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j = max
B∈B
wi(B)ui(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j

∑
i∈N
x∗i (B) < 1⇒ αi = 0
⇒ wi(B)ui(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j ≤ 0 ∀B ∈ B
Define Mi = maxB∈B{ui(B)}. Consider two cases
—
∑
i∈N
x∗i (B) = 1
In this case we have
∑
B∈B
[wi(B)ui(B)− P (B)]x∗i (B) =
∑
B∈B
max
B∈B
wi(B)ui(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j
x∗i (B)
= max
B∈B
{wi(B)ui(B)− P (B)} ·
∑
B∈B
x∗i (B)
= max
B∈B
{wi(B)ui(B)− P (B)} · 1
≥ max
B∈B
{wi(B)ui(B)− P (B)} ·
∑
B∈B
x∗k(B)
=
∑
B∈B
max
B∈B
{wi(B)ui(B)− P (B)}x∗k(B)
≥
∑
B∈B
[wi(B)ui(B)− P (B)]x∗k(B)
for all i, k ∈ N .
As wi ≥ 1− δw, we then have∑
B∈B
[ui(B)− P (B)]x∗i (B) ≥
∑
B∈B
[ui(B)− P (B)]x∗k(B)
−
∑
B∈B
(1− wi(B))ui(B)[x∗i (B)− x∗k(B)]
≥
∑
B∈B
[ui(B)− P (B)]x∗k(B)−
∑
B∈B
δwMi[x
∗
i (B)− x∗k(B)]
≥
∑
B∈B
[ui(B)− P (B)]x∗k(B)− δwMi
for all i, k ∈ N , and by choosing δw small enough we can ensure that δwMi ≤ u for
all i ∈ N .
—
∑
i∈N
x∗i (B) < 1
In this case we have x∗i (B) > 0⇒ wiui(B)− P (B) = 0
and
∑
i∈N x
∗
i (B) < 1⇒ wi(B)ui(B)− P (B) ≤ 0 ∀B ∈ B. Thus∑
B∈B
[wi(B)ui(B)− P (B)]x∗i (B) = 0 ≥
∑
B∈B
[wi(B)ui(B)− P (B)]x∗k(B)
for all i, k ∈ N .
As wi ≥ 1− δw we have∑
B∈B
[ui(B)− P (B)]x∗i (B) ≥
∑
B∈B
[ui(B)− P (B)]x∗k(B)
−
∑
B∈B
(1− wi(B))ui(B)[x∗i (B)− x∗k(B)]
≥
∑
B∈B
[ui(B)− P (B)]x∗k(B)− δwMi
for all i, k ∈ N , and by choosing δw small enough we can ensure that δwMi ≤ u for all
i ∈ N .
In all, we have the approximate envy-freeness condition holds.
D. PROOF OF POLYNOMIAL TIME
To prove that the algorithm is polynomial time, we first calculate the number of vari-
ables in (LIP).
Fix k, the number of possible bundles in set B is given by
|B| =
k∑
m=1
(|G|+m− 1
m
)
∼ O(|G|k)
Therefore the number of variables in (LIP) is given by
Nvar = |N | · |B| ∼ O(|N | · |G|k)
The number of constraints in (LIP) is |N | + |G|. Since linear programming problem
can be solved (average case) in polynomial time with regard to number of variables
and number of constraints, the first step of the algorithm can be finished in polynomial
time.
For the iterative rounding process, in each iteration, either at least one variable is
eliminated or at least one constraint is eliminated. So the number of rounds can not
be larger than sum of the number of constraints and the number of variables.
In each round, a linear programming is performed, and it can be solved in polyno-
mial time since its number of constraints and variables is polynomial. Therefore we
conclude that the iterative rounding process is also polynomial time.
As the authors of [Nguyen et al. 2015] proved that the Lottery Construction proce-
dure can finish in polynomial time, we conclude that the whole algorithm can be solved
in polynomial time with regard to |N | and |G|.
E. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
Given the types of the agents, (LIP) is transformed to
(LIPΘ) max
x≥0
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
B∈B
wθ(B)uθ(B)yθ(B)
s.t.
∑
B∈B
1
nθ
yθ(B) ≤ 1 θ ∈ Θ∑
θ∈Θ
∑
B∈B
Bjyθ(B) ≤ s˜j j ∈ G
After figuring out an optimal solution x∗ for (LIPΘ), individual shares are given by
x∗i (B) = y
∗
βi
(B)/nβi . In this sense (LIPΘ) is equivalent to (LIP) since the symmetrical
variables (shares of bundles of agents with same types) in (LIP) can have symmetri-
cal optimal solutions. Therefore we will consider only the solutions of (LIPΘ) in the
following part.
The dual of (LIPΘ) is given by
(DLIPΘ) min
α,p≥0
∑
θ∈Θ
αθ +
∑
j∈G
s˜jpj
s.t.
1
nθ
αθ ≥ wθ(B)uθ(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjpj θ ∈ Θ, B ∈ B
αθ ≤M θ ∈ Θ
where M is the optimal function value for (LIP∞), which we will define later.
Note that the last constraint in the above problem is an additional constraint to
ensure that the feasible region for the problem is bounded. Adding or deleting this
constraint would not affect the optimal solution for the problem, as M is greater or
equal to the optimal solution of all (LIPΘ), and there is no duality gap for linear pro-
gramming problems, we have M ≥ ∑θ∈Θ αθ +∑j∈G s′jpj ≥ αθ holds for θ ∈ Θ even if
we delete the third constraint. Thus this additional constraint is actually always true.
Consider an agent with type ξ who misreports his type as ζ while others truthfully
report their types, then we have the number of agent reporting each type to be
n′ξ = nξ − 1, n′ζ = nζ + 1,
n′θ = nθ θ ∈ Θ\{ξ, ζ}
Then (LIP′Θ) in this case is transformed to
(LIP′Θ) max
x≥0
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
B∈B
wθ(B)uθ(B)yθ(B)
s.t.
∑
B∈B
1
n′θ
yθ(B) ≤ 1 θ ∈ Θ∑
θ∈Θ
∑
B∈B
Bjyθ(B) ≤ s˜j j ∈ G
And the dual of (LIP′Θ) is given by
(DLIP′Θ) min
α,p≥0
∑
θ∈Θ
αθ +
∑
j∈G
s˜jpj
s.t.
1
n′θ
αθ ≥ wθ(B)uθ(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjpj θ ∈ Θ, B ∈ B
αθ ≤M θ ∈ Θ
When nθ → ∞ for all θ ∈ Θ, we have n′θ → ∞ for all θ ∈ Θ and both (LIPΘ) and
(LIP′Θ) converges to the following problem
(LIP∞) max
x≥0
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
B∈B
wθ(B)uθ(B)yθ(B)
s.t.
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
B∈B
Bjyθ(B) ≤ s˜j j ∈ G
And both (DLIPΘ) and (DLIP′Θ) converge to
(DLIP∞) min
α,p≥0
∑
θ∈Θ
αθ +
∑
j∈G
s˜jpj
s.t. 0 · αθ ≥ wθ(B)uθ(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjpj θ ∈ Θ, B ∈ B
αθ ≤M θ ∈ Θ
which is equivalent to the dual of (LIP∞), i.e.
(DLIP∞) min
α,p≥0
∑
j∈G
s˜jpj
s.t. 0 ≥ wθ(B)uθ(B)−
∑
j∈G
Bjpj θ ∈ Θ, B ∈ B
We have the following lemmas.
LEMMA E.1. With probability 1, (LIP∞) and (DLIP∞) both have a unique solution.
PROOF. See Appendix F.
LEMMA E.2. For a sequence of optimization problems P (n) that have common con-
tinuous objective function, and the feasible regions R(n) are compact, converges, and
satisfies the condition that
⋃∞
n=1R
(n) is bounded. Let P∗ be an optimization problem
with the same objective function as all P (n) and feasible region R∗ := lim
n→∞R
(n). If P ∗
has a unique optimal solution y∗, then any sequence y(n) of solutions of P (n) must con-
verge to y∗.
PROOF. See Appendix G.
Let nt = (ntθ1 , n
t
θ2
, · · · , ntθm) be any sequence of vectors such that nt → ∞ as t → ∞.
Denote the corresponding sequence of problems as (LIPΘ)t, (LIP′Θ)t, (DLIPΘ)t, and
(DLIP′Θ)t respectively. And solution sequences for the problem sequences are ytΘ, y′tΘ,
ptΘ, p′tΘ respectively.
We know that (LIP∞) has a unique solution with probability 1. Since the union of
feasible regions of (LIPΘ)t and (LIP′Θ)t is a subset of feasible region of (LIP∞), which
is bounded, and the objective function are the same, we can apply Lemma C.2 and
conclude that with probability 1, ytΘ and y′tΘ both converge to y∗Θ, a solution of (LIP∞).
Similarly, we know that (DLIP∞) has a unique solution with probability 1. Since
the union of feasible regions of (DLIPΘ)t and (DLIP′Θ)t is a subset of feasible region
of (DLIPΘ | nθ = 1∀θ ∈ Θ), which is bounded (with the additional constraint), and
the objective functions are the same, we can apply Lemma C.2 and conclude that with
probability 1, ptΘ and p′tΘ both converge to p∗Θ, a solution of (DLIP∞).
Then, apply Theorem 2.7 to (LIP′Θ)t we have
1
n′tξ
∑
B∈B
uξ(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j
 y∗∗(t)ξ (B) ≥ 1n′tζ
∑
B∈B
uξ(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j
 y∗∗(t)ζ (B)− u (I)
where y∗∗(t) is an optimal solution of (LIP′Θ)t. Denote y∗(t) as a solution for the corre-
sponding original problem (LIPΘ)t. We have y∗(t) and y∗∗(t) converge to the same limit
as nθ →∞ (with probability 1). Thus we have ‖y∗(t)−y∗∗(t)‖ → 0 as nθ →∞ with prob-
ability 1. Denote the corresponding price vector as p∗(t) and p∗∗(t). As p∗(t) and p∗∗(t)
converge to the same limit, we also have ‖p∗(t)−p∗∗(t)‖ → 0 as nθ →∞ with probability
1. Therefore we have for any ε0 > 0 there exist N0 such that when ntθ > N0 for all θ ∈ Θ
we have
1
ntξ
∑
B∈B
uξ(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗(t)
j
 y∗(t)ξ (B) = 1n′tξ + 1
∑
B∈B
uξ(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗(t)
j
 y∗(t)ξ (B)
=
1
n′tξ
∑
B∈B
uξ(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗(t)
j
 y∗(t)ξ (B)− 1n′tξ (n′tξ + 1)
∑
B∈B
uξ(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗(t)
j
 y∗(t)ξ (B)
≥ 1
n′tξ
∑
B∈B
uξ(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗∗(t)
j
 y∗∗(t)ξ (B)− 12ε0
− o((ntξ)−1)
≥ 1
n′tξ
∑
B∈B
uξ(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗∗(t)
j
 y∗∗(t)ξ (B)− ε0 (II)
with probability 1.
Combining (I)(II) we get for any ε0 > 0 there exist N0 such that when nθ > N0 for all
θ ∈ Θ we have
1
nξ
∑
B∈B
uξ(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j
 y∗ξ (B) ≥ 1n′ζ
∑
B∈B
uξ(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗∗
j
 y∗∗ζ (B)− u − ε0
with probability 1.
Since the final allocation of POPT is implemented as a lottery, where each agent of
type θ has allocation vector with expectation 1nθ y
∗
θ for (LIPΘ) (or
1
n′θ
y∗∗θ , for (LIP
′
Θ)).
Denote the final overall allocation vector as x for (LIP) and x˜ for (LIP’). Then we have
for any ε0 > 0 there exist N0 such that when nθ > N0 for all θ ∈ Θ such that
E
∑
B∈B
uβi(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗
j
xβi(B)
 ≥ E
∑
B∈B
uβi(B)−∑
j∈G
Bjp
∗∗
j
 x˜ζ(B)
− u − ε0
Proving the result.
F. PROOF OF LEMMA D.1
In (LIP∞) we have two set of parameters controlled by random variables: wi(B) ∼
U(1−δw, 1+δw), and s˜j ∼ U(sj−2δ, sj−δ). All of the random variables are independent.
The constraints of (LIP∞) defines a (bounded) polytope with finite number of ex-
treme points. Denote {q1, q2, · · · , qm} as the set of extreme points, we can see that
q1, q2, · · · , qm are random variables that depend only on s′j for j ∈ G.
Therefore, q1, q2, · · · , qm are independent of wi(B) for i ∈ N,B ∈ B. Define
v1, v2, · · · , vm such that vti(B) = qti(B)ui(B) for t = 1, 2, · · · ,m. As qs 6= qt for s 6= t
and ui(B) > 0, we have vs 6= vt for s 6= t. Then we can express the objective function
value at qt as wT qt.
Then we have for any s 6= t, s, t = 1, 2, · · · ,m,
Pr[wT qs = wT qt] = Pr[wT (qs − qt) = 0]
Since (qs− qt) is a non-zero vector which is independent of w, wT (qs− qt) is a contin-
uous random variable. Then the probability that this random variable has a specific
value is 0. Thus
Pr[wT qs = wT qt] = 0
It follows that
Pr[wT qs 6= wT qt ∀s 6= t] = 1
A lemma in [Ziegler 1995] states that a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of
a solution for a linear programming problem is that wT qs 6= wT qt for all t 6= s, s, t =
1, 2, · · · ,m. Therefore, with probability 1, we have (LIP∞) to have a unique solution.
Similarly, in (DLIP∞) we have a set of parameters controlled by random variables:
s˜j ∼ U(sj − 2δ, sj − δ). All of the random variables are independent. The constraints
defines a bounded polytope with finite number of extreme points. The coordinates of
the extreme points is a constant (hence independent of s˜j). Then, follow a similar proof
for (DLIP∞), we conclude that (DLIP∞) has a unique solution with probability 1.
Therefore, with probability 1, (LIP∞) and (DLIP∞) both have a unique solution.
G. PROOF OF LEMMA D.2
Denote the objective function of P (n) and P ∗ as f , and a sequence of solution of P (n) as
y(n). Denote the unique solution of P ∗ as y∗
For the sequence of optimization problems P (n) and P ∗, if P ∗ has solutions, then by
Berge’s Maximum Theorem the optimal objective function values of P (n) converges to
the optimal objective function value of P ∗. That is f(y(n))→ f(y∗) as n→∞.
Suppose that y(n) does not converge to y∗, which means that there exists some ε > 0
such that there exists a subsequence y(nk) satisfies
‖y(nk) − y∗‖ > ε
However, y(nk) is bounded. By Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem, there exist a subse-
quence y(nkt ) of y(nk) such that y(nkt ) converges to some point y˜. By the definition of set
convergence [Rockafellar and Wets 2009] the feasible regions R(nkt ) converges to the
feasible region R∗ of P ∗.
lim
t→∞R
(nkt ) = lim sup
t→∞
R(nkt ) = R∗
By definition of limits of sets [Rockafellar and Wets 2009], we have y˜ ∈
lim supt→∞R
(nkt ) thus y˜ ∈ R∗. Since the objective function is continuous, we have
f(y(nkt )) converges to f(y˜).
Since y(nkt ) is a subsequence of y(n) and f(y(n)) converges to f(y∗), we have f(y(nkt ))
converges to f(y∗). Therefore f(y˜) = f(y∗), which means that y˜ is also an optimal
solution of P ∗.
However y∗ 6= y˜, as ‖y˜−y∗‖ = lim
t→∞ ‖y
(nkt )−y∗‖ ≥ ε > 0. Thus y˜ is an optimal solution
different from y∗. This contradicts with the condition that y∗ is the unique solution for
P ∗.
Therefore y(n) must converge to y∗.
